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ABSTRACT
Online travel companies (“OTCs”) like Expedia and
Hotels.com facilitate discounted hotel room rates for
customers by contracting with hotels at a wholesale rate
and then allowing customers to book rooms on their
websites at a marked-up rate that is above the wholesale
rate but below the market rate. Many states allow cities
and counties to assess an occupancy or bed tax upon
persons reserving hotel rooms, with the collections
typically used to promote state and local tourism. Such
statutes generally require the hotel operator to collect and
remit the tax. OTCs have traditionally remitted the
wholesale rate and the occupancy tax on that rate to the
hotels, which in turn remit the tax to the city or state. This
practice has recently come under scrutiny, however, with
cities and counties arguing that OTCs should collect and
remit the tax on the full retail amount paid to OTCs by the
consumer. OTC litigation is occurring in state and federal
courts across the country, and courts are split on whether
the tax can be assessed on OTC profits. This Article will
analyze recent decisions, examine the reasons why courts
*
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are split, and then briefly discuss potential resolutions for
the OTCs and local governments.
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INTRODUCTION
Online travel companies (“OTCs”) like Expedia and
Hotels.com facilitate discounted hotel room rates for customers by
contracting with hotels at a wholesale rate and then allowing
customers to book rooms on their websites at a marked-up rate that
is above the wholesale rate but below the market rate. Many states
allow cities and counties to assess an occupancy or bed tax upon
persons reserving hotel rooms, with the collections typically used
to promote state and local tourism. Such statutes generally require
the hotel operator to collect and remit the tax. OTCs have
traditionally remitted the wholesale rate and the occupancy tax on
that rate to the hotels, which in turn remit the tax to the city or

TECHNOLOGY, TRAVEL COMPANIES & TAXATION

45

state. This practice has recently come under scrutiny, however,
with cities and counties arguing that OTCs should collect and remit
the tax on the full retail amount paid to OTCs by the consumer.
OTC litigation is occurring in state and federal courts across the
country, and courts are split on whether the tax may be assessed on
OTC profits.
Determining whether an OTC is required to collect and remit
occupancy tax on its profit margin is a question of statutory
interpretation. While the various state and local occupancy tax
statutes have the unified purpose of raising revenue for tourism
promotion, the language used in these statutes is inconsistent. As
discussed in the analysis below, OTC liability essentially hinges
upon a court’s interpretation of slight differences in occupancy tax
statutes. While the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that
the Kentucky occupancy tax statute it recently considered did not
require the OTCs to collect the tax, other courts analyzing slightly
different statutory language have reached the opposite conclusion.
These differing interpretations have led the OTCs to seek a federal
exemption from collection of any and all state and local occupancy
tax on profit margin.
While the OTCs are garnering varied success in litigation,
these victories will not insulate the OTCs from eventual liability to
collect and remit on the full retail amount, since states and cities
can and likely will amend their statutes to include OTCs. If OTCs
hope to avoid collecting in the future, they must continue to seek
concrete resolutions through state exemptions, a federal
exemption, or by arguing that statutes requiring OTCs to collect
and remit on the full retail amount are violative of the state or
federal constitution. This Article will discuss three recent
decisions, each reaching different conclusions on the ultimate issue
of whether OTCs are required to collect and remit the occupancy
tax on their profit margin. 1 The Article will then analyze these
1

There are a number of ancillary issues addressed in OTC litigation that
are outside the scope of this Article and will not be addressed here. These
include claims of consumer protection violations, conversion, unjust enrichment,
and false and misleading business practices. Some cases discuss other issues
such as exhaustion, improper jurisdiction, standing, statute of limitations, and
equitable defenses such as laches, estoppel, and waiver. Still others address
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disparate results and summarize what each decision means for
OTCs and local governments. Finally, the Article will propose
potential long-term occupancy tax solutions for both OTCs and
local governments.
I. HISTORY OF ONLINE TRAVEL COMPANIES AND OCCUPANCY
TAXES: AGENCY MODEL VS. MERCHANT MODEL
A. Occupancy Tax Statutes
Many states enacted occupancy tax 2 statutes “for the purpose
of promoting convention and tourist activity.” 3 These statutes may
include a state occupancy tax, or may authorize counties and
municipalities to assess local occupancy taxes. 4 The taxes are
typically assessed on the person renting the hotel room, and are
collected and remitted by the hotel to the taxing authority. 5
The occupancy tax statute considered in Louisville/Jefferson
County Metro Government v. Hotels.com, 6 is fairly representative
of the various state statutes. The Kentucky statute authorizes
counties to impose occupancy tax on “the rent for every occupancy
constitutional defenses, where the OTCs allege any occupancy tax assessed
upon them would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Dormant Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution, or similar clauses in state constitutions.
While not addressed in this Article, these types of arguments should be
considered when litigating the applicability of occupancy taxes to OTCs.
2
Some state and local statutes use terms such as “bed tax,” “transient room
tax,” or “tourism development tax.” See, e.g., LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON CNTY,
KY., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 121.01(A); LEXINGTON–FAYETTE URBAN CNTY,
KY., CHARTER OF CODE OF CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2–172(a) (using the term
“transient room tax”).
3
See, e.g., Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't v. Hotels.com, L.P., 590
F.3d 381, 383 (6th Cir. 2009).
4
See id. at 383.
5
In some cases the tax is assessed upon the hotel operator rather than the
consumer. In cases where the tax is assessed upon the consumer and collected
by the operator, the question is whether the OTC is responsible to collect and
remit. In cases where the tax is assessed upon the operator, the issue is whether
the OTC is required to pay the tax on its profit margin. The statutory analysis is
essentially the same in both cases.
6
590 F.3d 381.
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of a suite, room, or rooms, charged by all persons, companies,
corporations, or other like or similar persons, groups or
organizations doing business as motor courts, motels, hotels, inns
or like or similar accommodations businesses.” 7 The majority of
these statutes were enacted before consumers began booking hotel
rooms online and do not specifically address OTCs.
B. OTC Pricing Models
Many occupancy tax opinions focus on the pricing models used
by OTCs. Originally most OTCs used the “agency model,” which
is similar to the model employed by traditional travel agents. 8
Under the agency model, an OTC would act as a broker so that the
third party purchaser avoided dealing directly with the hotel
owner. 9 In return, the OTC would receive a facilitation fee. 10 The
amount of occupancy tax remitted by the hotel was calculated
based on the entire amount paid by the consumer, including the
amount retained by the OTC as a facilitation fee. 11
Over time, most OTCs transitioned away from the agency
model and adopted the more profitable “merchant model.” 12 Under
the merchant model, an OTC contracts with hotels for the right to
broker or facilitate the reservation of hotel rooms at a discounted
or wholesale rate. 13 The OTC then advertises and offers the rooms
for sale to the public on its website. When the customer books a
hotel room reservation through the OTC’s website, the OTC
charges the customer an amount that is greater than the wholesale
rate, referred to as the “marked-up rate,” which represents the total
amount paid by the consumer. 14 The difference between the
marked-up rate and the wholesale rate is the OTC’s profit margin.
7

Id. at 383.
See City of Goodlettsville, Tenn. v. Priceline.com, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d
982, 985 (M.D. Tenn. 2009).
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
See Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 285 Ga. 684, 684 (2009),
reconsideration denied (June 30, 2009).
8
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The majority of OTC litigation focuses on tax treatment of the
merchant model. Under the agency model, it is clear that the
amount earned by the OTC is rightfully classified as a commission
not subject to occupancy tax. The tax waters become muddier,
however, when OTCs list and sell hotel rooms at a markup and
rent the rooms directly to customers. The primary issue in all OTC
litigation is whether occupancy tax should be assessed on the
marked-up amount. The cases below examine this issue in detail.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: A COMPARISON OF OTC
OCCUPANCY TAX CASES
Courts are split on whether occupancy tax should be collected
and remitted on OTC profit margin. Because occupancy taxes are
assessed pursuant to state and/or local statute or ordinances,
opinions are primarily devoted to the interpretation of the relevant
statute. A court’s conclusion generally hinges on whether an OTC
is included in the definition of persons or businesses required to
collect and remit the tax. This section will discuss three recent
opinions that highlight the kaleidoscope of decisions resulting from
OTC litigation. In the first case, Expedia, Inc. v. City of
Columbus, 15 the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that while the
statute in question did not encompass OTCs, OTCs voluntarily
subjected themselves to the tax via contracts with hotels and were
therefore required to collect and remit the tax. In contrast, in
Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government v. Hotels.com, 16
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found OTCs were not
encompassed by the statute and not required to collect and remit on
profit margin. Finally, in County of Monroe, Florida v.
Priceline.com, Inc., 17 the court held the Florida statute at issue was
broad enough as written to encompass OTCs.

15

Id.
590 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2009).
17
09-10004, 2009 WL 4890664 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2009).
16
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A. Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus: OTCs Are Contractually
Obligated to Collect and Remit Occupancy Taxes on Markedup Rate Even if Not Statutorily Required to Do So
In Columbus, the city petitioned for declaratory judgment
against Expedia, alleging that under Expedia’s merchant model,
hotel occupancy taxes were to be calculated using the marked-up
rate or “charge to the public,” rather than the negotiated wholesale
rate. 18 Columbus enacted its city occupancy tax ordinance pursuant
to the Georgia Enabling Statute, which allowed municipalities to
impose an excise tax “at the applicable rate on the lodging charges
actually collected.” 19 Columbus’ occupancy tax ordinance imposed
“an excise tax in the amount of seven percent of the charge to the
public upon the furnishing for value of any room or rooms or
lodging or accommodations furnished by any person licensed by or
required to pay business or occupation taxes to Columbus for
operating a hotel . . . .” 20 The tax was imposed upon the guest and
required the person or entity “collecting the tax from the hotel or
motel guest” to remit the tax to the local government. 21
Based on these facts, the trial court determined as a matter of
law that “charge to the public” and “lodging charges actually
collected” included the marked-up rate that Expedia charged its
customers, and not the wholesale rate. 22 The trial court also
concluded that any service or facilitation fees “separately
disclosed” to Expedia’s customers were not taxable. The court then
granted the city permanent injunctive relief, requiring Expedia to
“collect the hotel occupancy tax based on the total amount it
discloses to the consumer as the room rate, room charge or other
comparable term . . . .” 23 The injunction also required Expedia to
separately disclose both the room rate and all hotel occupancy
taxes to the consumer either online or at the hotel. 24
18

285 Ga. at 686.
Id. at 685 (citing GA. CODE § 48-13-51(a)(1)(B)(i) (2009)).
20
Id. (citing COLUMBUS CODE § 19-110 et seq.) (emphasis added).
21
Id. at 685-86 (citing GA. CODE § 48-13-51(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2009)).
22
Id. at 686.
23
Id. at 686-87.
24
Id.
19
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Expedia appealed the trial court’s decision, presenting four
main arguments. 25 First, it argued the trial court erred as a matter
of law in interpreting the statute and ordinance to require Expedia
to collect the tax. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected this
argument, stating that the trial court did not conclude as a matter of
law that Expedia must collect the tax, but instead, that Expedia in
fact collected the occupancy taxes pursuant to a private contractual
agreement irrespective of any statutory obligation. 26
Second, Expedia argued that it was not obligated to collect and
remit the tax on its profit margin either under the statute or
pursuant to contract. 27 The Supreme Court similarly rejected this
argument, stating that Expedia “rendered itself duty-bound” to
remit the taxes when it contracted with hotels to collect the
occupancy tax. 28 It found that whether Expedia was a hotel, motel,
or innkeeper was “inapposite” for the purpose of remitting taxes it
actually collected from consumers. 29 The Court stated in
summation that because the statute “unequivocally require[d]” the
taxes to be remitted by the entity who collected them, Expedia was
required to remit the tax payments to the city. 30
Expedia’s third argument was that the statutory terms “lodging
charges actually collected” and “charge to the public” were
misinterpreted by the trial court to encompass the marked-up rate
charged by Expedia to its customers, and that the terms instead
applied to the wholesale rate Expedia paid to the hotels. 31 The
Court determined that a plain reading of the statute made it clear
that the tax was to be assessed and collected on the full marked-up
amount, and not the wholesale amount. 32 The Court stated that,
“Expedia is not the end-consumer, is not a member of the public at
large, and is not the occupant of the hotel room.” 33 For these
reasons, the court concluded that the wholesale rate paid by
25

Id. at 687-89
Id. at 688.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 689.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 690.
26

TECHNOLOGY, TRAVEL COMPANIES & TAXATION

51

Expedia as a “non-occupant” could not be the rate upon which the
tax was based. 34
Finally, Expedia argued that its “undisclosed facilitation fee”
was not taxable. 35 According to the record, Expedia was not
separately listing the tax and the amount for the facilitation fee, but
instead listed a total room rate, which included a disclaimer that
some of the amount paid was for occupancy taxes and some was a
“facilitation fee” to be retained by Expedia. 36 The court also
rejected this argument, concluding Expedia’s disclaimer to the
customer that the room rate was a combination of cost and fees
was “insufficient to inform the taxpayer of his true tax liability.” 37
Because of this, the Court determined that the trial court did not err
when it held the taxable amount, including any undisclosed fee,
was the marked-up rate charged by Expedia to its customers. 38
B. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government v. Hotels.com:
OTCs Not Subject To Occupancy Tax Under Kentucky Statute
In Louisville, two county governments in Kentucky brought a
suit against Hotels.com and other OTCs, alleging the OTCs were
violating local occupancy tax ordinances by failing to remit
occupancy tax on OTC profits earned under the merchant model. 39
Each of the plaintiff counties had enacted occupancy tax
ordinances 40 pursuant to the Kentucky Enabling Act, which
34

Id.
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. See also City of Findlay v. Hotels.com, 441 F. Supp. 2d 855 (N.D.
Ohio 2006). In Findlay, the court concluded that although OTCs had no direct
taxable duty under the City’s occupancy tax ordinance to collect and remit the
tax, because the OTCs undertook to charge and collect a sales tax on
transactions with their customers, they assumed the responsibility for such
collections and the duty to remit them. 441 F. Supp. 2d at 861 (citations
omitted).
39
Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't v. Hotels.com, L.P., 590 F.3d 381,
383 (6th Cir. 2009).
40
See LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON CNTY, KY., CODE OF ORDINANCES §
121.01(A); LEXINGTON–FAYETTE URBAN CNTY, KY., CHARTER OF CODE OF
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2–172(a).
35
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authorized counties to assess a “transient room tax” on “the rent
for every occupancy of a suite, room, or rooms, charged by all
persons, companies, corporations, or other similar persons, groups
or organizations doing business as motor courts, motels, hotels,
inns or like or similar accommodations businesses.” 41
Once a room was rented, the OTCs would remit the wholesale
rate and the occupancy tax, calculated based on the wholesale rate,
to the hotel operator. 42 The counties noted that the OTCs included
an amount for “tax recovery charges and fees” in the marked-up
amount charged to consumers. 43 The district court granted the
OTCs’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the OTCs were not “like
or similar” to “motor courts, motels, hotels, or inns” because they
“have neither ownership, nor physical control, of the rooms they
offer for rent.” 44 The counties appealed the decision to the Sixth
Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s grant of the OTCs’
motion to dismiss. Interpreting the statute using the framework
developed by Kentucky state courts, the court concluded that the
OTCs were not “like or similar” entities to those targeted by the
tax. The court first reasoned that it could not determine whether
OTCs constituted “like or similar business accommodations” under
a plain meaning analysis. 45 Upon further statutory interpretation,
the court concluded the district court had correctly applied the
interpretative canon of ejusdem generis 46 when it determined that
“like or similar accommodations businesses” should be restricted
by the four types of businesses listed immediately prior to the
phrase, “motor courts, motels, hotels, and inns.” 47 Based on this
interpretation, the district court reasoned OTCs were not similar to

41

590 F.3d at 383 (citing KY. REV. STAT. § 91A.390(1) (2009)).
Id. at 383-84.
43
Id. at 383.
44
Id. at 384.
45
Id. at 387.
46
Ejusdem generis is a canon of construction holding that when a general
word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be
interpreted to include only items of the same class as those listed. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 236 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
47
Louisville, 590 F.3d at 388.
42
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the businesses listed in the statute because OTCs had neither
ownership nor physical control over the hotel rooms. 48
The court rejected the counties’ argument that the district
court’s interpretation would lead to the “absurd result” where a
county would receive less tax money if a consumer books a hotel
room through an OTC than if the room is booked directly with a
hotel. 49 The court concluded it was for the Kentucky legislature,
not the court, to close any “loophole” that resulted from the
interpretation. 50
Importantly, the court distinguished the Kentucky statute
before it from the Georgia statute considered in Columbus on the
basis that the Georgia statute was a tax “on the charge to the
public” for a room. 51 The Sixth Circuit agreed that such conclusive
language would result in the tax being calculated using the
marked-up amount, but stated that such clarity was “sorely
lacking” in the Kentucky statute. 52 Relying on the principle that
doubts or ambiguities in tax statutes must be construed strictly and
in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing powers, the court
held that the counties’ ordinance did not encompass the OTCs and
affirmed the district court’s grant of the OTCs’ motion to
dismiss.53
C. County of Monroe, Florida v. Priceline.com, Inc.: Occupancy
Tax Ordinance Broad Enough to Encompass OTCs
In Monroe, 54 the county brought an action against Priceline and
other OTCs alleging the OTCs had failed to remit the proper
48

Id. at 388. See also Pitt Cnty. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 553 F.3d 308, 313 (4th
Cir. 2009) (concluding OTCs were not encompassed by the North Carolina
occupancy tax statute at issue, relying on the principle of ejusdem generis to
determine that OTCs were not “similar type businesses” to hotels because they
did not “provide lodging to patrons on site”).
49
Louisville, 590 F.3d at 388-89.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 389.
52
Id.
53
Id. (citing George v. Scent, 346 S.W.2d 784, 789 (Ky.1961)).
54
Cnty. of Monroe, Florida v. Priceline.com, Inc., 09-10004, 2009 WL
4890664 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2009).

54
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amount of occupancy tax owed to the county. 55 Pursuant to a
Florida statute, the county imposed a three percent tax on “each
dollar of the total rental charged every person who rents, leases or
lets for consideration any living quarters or accommodations in
any hotel, apartment hotel, motel, resort motel, apartment motel,
roominghouse, tourist or trailer camp or condominium for a term
of six months or fewer.” 56 The county ordinance further provided
the tax “shall be charged by the person receiving the consideration
for the lease or rental, and it shall be collected from the lessee,
tenant or customer at the time of payment of the consideration for
such lease or rental.” 57
The OTCs filed a motion to dismiss. The question considered
by the court was whether the OTCs “rent, lease or let for
consideration” hotel rooms, and whether the OTCs were “the
person[s] receiving the consideration for the lease or rental” such
that they were subject to the county’s occupancy tax. 58
The court analyzed Florida’s Enabling Statute, which stated,
“[E]very person who rents, leases, or lets for consideration any
living quarters or accommodations in any hotel, apartment hotel,
motel, [or] resort motel . . . is exercising a privilege which is
subject to taxation under this section . . . .” 59 Based on the broad
language of the statute and the ordinance, the court denied the
OTCs motion to dismiss. The court specifically distinguished this
case from Louisville, stating that the county’s occupancy tax and
Florida’s Enabling Act “swe[pt] more broadly” than the statutory
language considered in Louisville and cases similarly decided. 60 It
stated that, “[t]he statutory terms at issue here are not limited to
those ‘operating’ hotels or engaged in a particular line of business,
but rather apply expressly to ‘every person’ who rents rooms for
consideration . . . .” 61 Unlike the Kentucky statute at issue in

55

Id. at *1.
Id. (citing MONROE CNTY CODE § 23–197(a)).
57
Id. (citing MONROE CNTY CODE § 23–197(c)).
58
Id.
59
Id. at *2 (citing FLA. STATUTES § 125.0104(3) (2009)).
60
Id. at *4.
61
Id.
56
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Louisville, the Florida law was so clear and unambiguous the court
easily concluded OTCs were encompassed by the provision.
III. SUMMATION OF COURT DECISIONS AND OTC OCCUPANCY
TAX OUTLOOK
Louisville, Columbus, and Monroe fairly represent the array of
decisions resulting from OTC litigation. While some courts have
adopted the Louisville reasoning and held that OTCs are not
subject to ambiguous occupancy tax ordinances that do not
contemplate OTCs specifically, 62 others find Columbus’
conclusion highly persuasive—that is, regardless of whether the
OTCs are statutorily obligated to collect and remit the tax on profit
margin, contractual agreements under the merchant model require
them to do so. 63 Monroe stands for the proposition that some
ordinances are broad enough as adopted to encompass the OTCs.
Attorneys litigating these cases should carefully analyze state
enabling statutes and local ordinances enacted pursuant to the
statutes. As noted by the court in Monroe, terms such as “operator”
and “vendor” indicate that the provision specifically encompasses
the physical hotel, 64 whereas a phrase such as “person receiving
the consideration for the lease or rental” seems to more readily
encompass all persons in the business of renting rooms for
consideration, including OTCs. 65 Ambiguity with respect to the
amount to be collected is also relevant. In Louisville, the statute
simply discussed “rent charged,” without giving much substance to
the term, 66 whereas the Monroe statute called for the tax to be
collected on “each dollar of the total rental charged.” 67 The
statutory language in these cases was central to the courts’
conclusions—the definite terms of the Florida provision made the
62
63

See, e.g., Pitt Cnty. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 553 F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2009).
See, e.g., City of Findlay v. Hotels.com, 441 F. Supp. 2d 855 (N.D. Ohio

2006).
64

Cnty. of Monroe, 09-10004, 2009 WL 4890664, *3.
Id. at *4.
66
Louisville, 590 F.3d at 383 (citing KY. REV. STAT. § 91A.390(1) (2009)).
67
Cnty. of Monroe, 09-10004, 2009 WL 4890664, *1 (citing MONROE
CNTY CODE § 23–197(a)).
65

56
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decision for the Monroe court much easier than the ambiguous
terms of the Kentucky provision considered in Louisville.
Where the provisions of the occupancy tax statute in question
are ambiguous enough to result in a Louisville decision, the
potential that a court will reach a conclusion similar to the Georgia
Supreme Court’s decision in Columbus must be acknowledged. If
OTCs are contractually agreeing to collect and remit the tax, either
to the hotel or the taxing authority, the court may conclude they are
contractually obligated to collect and remit the tax on the full
marked-up amount even if the statute does not encompass the
OTCs or those amounts. The Columbus court indicated that its
decision rested at least in part on the fact that the OTCs did not
itemize the amounts collected at the time of sale. 68 Thus, an OTC
may be able to avoid a Columbus result by itemizing the amounts
collected as “facilitation fees,” which would then presumably
exempt those amounts from the tax.
Such changes may only be temporary fixes, however, since
state legislatures can simply amend their enabling statutes to
include OTCs and require the tax be collected on the full markedup amount. All is not lost for the OTCs in this respect, however.
Just as states can amend statutes to specifically include OTCs, the
OTCs can lobby state legislatures for an exclusion or exemption.
In St. Louis County v. Prestige Travel, Inc., 69 the Missouri
Supreme Court dismissed the county’s occupancy tax case against
OTCs after the Missouri State Legislature passed a bill specifically
exempting the OTCs from occupancy tax. This is a plausible and
somewhat concrete solution for OTCs if they can persuade state
legislatures to follow in Missouri’s footsteps. The viability of this
solution seems less and less realistic, however, as state and local
governments face budget shortages and search for ways to fill their
coffers (which is why the majority of this litigation is initiated in
the first instance).
OTCs are also seeking a federal resolution through passage of
legislation either exempting the OTCs from any state or local
occupancy tax 70 or prohibiting state taxation of “amounts charged
68

Columbus, 285 Ga. at 690.
St. Louis Cnty. v. Prestige Travel, Inc., 344 S.W.3d 708 (Mo. 2011).
70
Grace Gagliano, Online Travel Companies, Hoteliers at Odds,
69
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or retained for facilitating the booking of . . . hotel
accommodations . . . .” 71 The appeal of a federal solution is
twofold: it saves the OTCs from having to lobby 50 state
legislatures, and more importantly, it is a more permanent fix
because the OTCs would no longer be at the mercy of the state
legislatures, who may change their minds about an exemption
when money runs short.
Another option for OTCs is to litigate collection of the tax as
either a state or federal constitutional issue, arguing, for example,
that the taxes unduly burden interstate commerce and violate the
the Dormant Commerce Clause. 72 Expedia had little luck with this
argument in Columbus, where the court refused to consider the
constitutional issue since it concluded that the OTCs had
voluntarily submitted themselves to taxation via contracts with the
hotels. 73 OTCs have been equally unsuccessful with this argument
in other courts, even when courts substantively examine the
constitutional issues. 74
CONCLUSION
Case-by-case litigation perpetuates ambiguity and further
complicates the OTC occupancy tax issue. While each case is an
exercise in statutory interpretation, slight differences in statutory
language or interpretative inclination will assure differing judicial
conclusions. In this time of fiscal deficiency, counties are unlikely
to back down from this potential revenue source. To reach a more
concrete resolution, OTCs and counties can circumvent the judicial
BRADENTON HERALD (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.bradenton.com/
2011/02/23/2978845/online-travel-companies-hoteliers.html.
71
S. 1934, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011).
72
For a thoughtful examination of the Dormant Commerce Clause issue, see
Jennifer Rothschild, Pitt County v. Hotels.com: The Dormant Commerce Clause
and State Taxation of Online Travel Companies, 64 TAX LAW. 223 (2010)
(concluding that the Dormant Commerce Clause would not prohibit state and
local governments from requiring OTCs to collect and remit occupancy tax).
73
Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 285 Ga. 684, 690-91 (2009),
reconsideration denied (June 30, 2009).
74
See, e.g., City of Charleston, S.C., v. Hotels.com, LP, 586 F. Supp. 2d
538, 544-45 (D.S.C. 2008).
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process and instead seek legislative intervention—with OTCs
seeking an exemption from the tax and counties seeking an express
inclusion of OTCs in their states’ occupancy tax statutes. OTCs
can also continue to pursue a federal exemption. Regardless of the
eventual outcome, both parties are likely better served by
legislative resolution rather than the costly and time-consuming
exercise of litigating the interpretation of every occupancy tax
statute in the country.
PRACTICE POINTERS


Because of the importance of statutory language, and the
variances between occupancy tax statutes, it is important to
compare the language of the statute at issue in your case with
statutes considered in prior cases to determine whether a
particular court holding or conclusion will be persuasive in
your case.



Terms such as “operator” and “vendor” indicate that the
provision specifically applies to the physical hotel, whereas a
phrase such as “person receiving the consideration for the lease
or rental” seems to more readily encompass all persons in the
business of renting rooms for consideration, including OTCs.



With respect to the amount to be collected, ambiguous terms
undefined by statutory language are more favorable for OTCs
than definite terms such as those in Monroe, where the statute
called for the tax to be collected on “each dollar of the total
rental charged.”



OTCs should itemize the amounts collected as “facilitation
fees.” This should exempt the fees from occupancy tax and
also help to avoid a Columbus result, where the court found
OTCs had a contractual duty to collect and remit regardless of
statutory language.



In addition to statutory arguments, OTCs should develop any
federal constitutional arguments when seeking to avoid a duty
to collect and remit occupancy taxes.



OTCs and counties can circumvent the judicial process by
seeking legislative action. OTCs can seek state or federal
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exemptions from occupancy tax statutes, and counties can seek
to have OTCs specifically included in their state’s occupancy
tax statute.
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